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CASE SUMMARY
PATEL V. FACEBOOK, INC.:
THE COLLECTION, STORAGE, AND
USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA AS A
CONCRETE INJURY UNDER BIPA
JESSICA ROBLES*
INTRODUCTION
Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) amassed one of the most extensive fa-
cial-template databases in the world through the use of facial-recognition
technology.1 However, Facebook is not alone; both private and public
sector entities are heavily investing in improving their facial-identifica-
tion technology.2 Facial geometry data are unique to each person3 and
can be used to identify an individual. Once a facial image has been cap-
tured and stored in a facial-template database, “the individual has no re-
course” because one cannot change facial geometry as quickly as a
password or a social security number.4
Although companies may use facial-recognition technology for valid
purposes, uses of facial-recognition technology to target specific groups
raise “questions around abuse, consent, weaponization, and discrimina-
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Golden Gate University School of Law; B.A. Mathematics, California
State University, San Bernardino; Associate Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review.
1 Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech Is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-faces-facial-rec
ognition-technology.html.
2 Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will It Take Us?,
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-
magazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technology/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
3 Cade Metz, Facial Recognition Tech Is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, N.Y.
TIMES (July 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-faces-facial-rec
ognition-technology.html.
4 Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1269 (2019) (quoting the Biometric Information
Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5(c) (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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tory uses of this technology.”5 From a privacy standpoint, the potential
use of facial-recognition technology to search against millions of photo-
graphs without the consent of “law-abiding citizens is a major privacy
violation.”6 These concerns have fueled an increase in data privacy legis-
lation7 as well as litigation, such as Patel v. Facebook, Inc.
I. BACKGROUND
Both private sector and public sector facial identification databases
put individuals at risk of mistaken identity, unauthorized searches, and
erosion of due-process protections.8 With these risks in mind, a few
states enacted biometric privacy statutes.9 In 2008, the Illinois General
Assembly passed the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
(“BIPA”) to regulate the use of biometric identifiers.10 BIPA is unique
because it provides for a private right of action, meaning that Illinois
residents can file a lawsuit seeking damages for violations of the stat-
ute.11 This contrasts with the laws in other states, which only allow state
actors to bring claims on behalf of private individuals. Allowance of a
private cause of action has generated a multitude of lawsuits.12 Two re-
5 Kate Kaye, This Little-Known Facial-Recognition Accuracy Test Has Big Influence, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Jan. 7, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/this-little-known-facial-recogni
tion-accuracy-test-has-big-influence/ (quoting Joy Buolamwini (internal quotations omitted)).
6 Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition to Mine State Driver’s License Databases,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-fa-
cial-recognition.html?module=inline; see also Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License
Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST. (July 7, 2019 12:54 p.m.),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-
are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/.
7 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 14,
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumer-
data-privacy.aspx.
8 Nicole Black, Who Stole My Face? The Risks of Law Enforcement Use of Facial Recogni-
tion Software, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 14, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/11/who-stole-my-
face-the-risks-of-law-enforcement-use-of-facial-recognition-software/.
9 Molly K. McGinley, Kenn Brotman, Erinn L. Rigney, The Biometric Bandwagon Rolls On:
Biometric Legislation Proposed Across the United States, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/biometric-bandwagon-rolls-biometric-legislation-proposed-across-
united-states.
10 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 14/1-14/99 (2008).
11 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008).
12 See, e.g. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019) (finding
Article III standing where defendant failed to provide notice or obtain written consent for the collec-
tion, storage, and use of a fourteen year old’s fingerprint). But see Santana v. Take-Two Interactive
Software, Inc., 717 Fed.App’x. 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding no Article III standing where
defendant informed users that a face scan used to create a gaming avatar would be visible to other
players); Rivera v. Google, 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1007-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2018) (finding no
Article III standing where plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the collection of facial scans
created a substantial risk of identity theft); McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16C03777, 2016
2
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cent cases finding Article III standing are Rosenbach v. Six Flags En-
tertainment Corp. and Patel v. Facebook, Inc.
Private individuals who bring a claim under BIPA must still have
standing to sue. To have standing to sue, the plaintiff must allege an
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that
the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial opinion.13 In
Rosenbach, the Illinois Supreme Court defined an injury-in-fact by hold-
ing that “in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ person and be entitled to
seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to [BIPA],” the
individual does not need to claim a harm “beyond [a procedural] viola-
tion of his or her rights under [BIPA].”14 In Patel, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) echoed the Illi-
nois Supreme court’s decision in Rosenbach by reaffirming that, for pur-
poses of establishing standing in the federal courts, a violation of
intangible statutory rights under BIPA without further harm is a suffi-
cient injury-in-fact.15 Moreover, in Patel, the Ninth Circuit applied this
definition of an injury-in-fact to affirm the district court’s class certifica-
tion and denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.16
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Facebook is a social networking company with over two billion ac-
tive users worldwide.17 New users register, create a user profile, may add
friends, and interact with their network by sharing content.18 In 2010,
Facebook launched its tag suggestions program.19 The tag suggestions
program uses facial-recognition technology to scan the photographs that
users upload to suggest to the user to tag a specific person.20
When a user creates a profile and adds a picture of one’s face,
Facebook gathers information from the image and creates a face tem-
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100404 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016) (finding no Article III standing where defendants
failed to notify or obtain consent prior to scanning fingerprints used to lock and unlock storage
lockers).
13 Patel v. Facebook Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 948, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
14 Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019).
15 See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2019).
16 See Id.
17 J. Clement, Number of Facebook Users Worldwide 2008-2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
18 J. Clement, Number of Facebook Users Worldwide 2008-2019, STATISTA (Aug. 9, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
19 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1268.
20 Id.
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plate.21 Facebook stores face templates in one of its data centers,22 many
of which are located in the United States.23 When a second user uploads
a picture, the facial-recognition technology gathers “various geometric
data points” from that image and generates a facial map or “signature.”24
Under BIPA, a person’s facial signature or facial geometry, is a biomet-
ric identifier.25 The technology then runs these new facial signatures
against its large database of face templates to determine whether the face
signature matches a face template already in the database.26 If there is a
match, Facebook then suggests the second user tag the person in the im-
age who matches a face template.27
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Carlo Licata, Nimesh Patel, and Adam Penzen, sued
Facebook in separate lawsuits for BIPA violations.28 In August 2015, the
plaintiffs consolidated their separate lawsuits into a class action com-
plaint and became class representatives.29 The Illinois plaintiffs alleged
that the tag suggestions program violated sections 15(a) and 15(b) of
BIPA because Facebook failed to provide notice and obtain written con-
sent before generating, storing, and using their biometric identifiers.30
On February 26, 2018, the district court denied a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing.31 The district court held that a transgression of the
BIPA notice and consent provisions “is an intangible harm that consti-
tutes a concrete injury-in-fact.”32 Two months later, on April 16, 2018,
the district court certified the class consisting of “Facebook users located
in Illinois for whom Facebook created and stored a face template after
June 7, 2011.”33 Facebook then appealed the district court’s ruling.34
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Rachel Peterson, Data Centers Year in Review, FACEBOOK ENG’G (Jan. 1, 2019), https://
engineering.fb.com/data-center-engineering/data-centers-2018/.
24 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1268.
25 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/10 (2008).
26 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1268.
27 Id. at 1268.
28 Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 950–51.
29 See Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1268; see also In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig.,
185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
30 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1268; Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 951.
31 Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 950.
32 Id. at 954.
33 In re Facebook, 326 F.R.D. at 540.
34 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1269–70.
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II. NINTH CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
A. ARTICLE III STANDING TWO-STEP APPROACH
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether the
plaintiffs had standing.35 The court explained that to establish Article III
standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact.36 To establish
an injury-in-fact, the court must find that the harm to the plaintiff is con-
crete and particularized, and actual or imminent.37 The Ninth Circuit
clarified that even an intangible injury might qualify as an injury-in-fact
as long as it is sufficiently concrete.38 To determine whether an injury is
sufficiently concrete, the court considers history and legislative intent.39
Similar to the district court, the Ninth Circuit used a traditional two-
step approach to determine whether the statutory violation caused a con-
crete injury.40 Under the test, a court asks (1) whether “the statutory pro-
visions at issue were established to protect the plaintiff’s concrete
interests, and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged
in this case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such
interests.”41 The Ninth Circuit then applied each part of the test.
1. The Capture and Use of Biometric Information Without Consent
Invades Concrete Interests
Facebook contended that their alleged non-compliance with BIPA’s
notice and consent provisions amounted to a procedural violation of
BIPA without actual harm to the plaintiffs.42 Moreover, Facebook argued
that a statutory violation of BIPA was insufficient to establish a concrete
injury for purposes of Article III standing.43 The plaintiffs argued that
under BIPA, they suffered a concrete injury when Facebook generated,
stored, and used their facial geometries without their consent.44 Addi-
35 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1270.
36 Id.
37 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations
omitted)).
38 Id.
39 Id. (quoting Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
40 Id. at 1270–71.
41 Id. (quoting Spokeo, 867 F.3d at 1113 (internal quotations omitted)).
42 Id. at 1271.
43 Id. at 1271.
44 Id. at 1271.
5
Robles: Patel v. Facebook, Inc.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
66 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
tionally, the plaintiffs stated that a procedural violation is a concrete in-
jury, and that they did not have to claim additional harms.45
To determine whether a concrete interest existed, the Ninth Circuit
first looked to history to assess whether the alleged privacy harm resem-
bled one that provided grounds for a lawsuit in the past.46 The court
found that the Supreme Court of the United States had recognized that a
right to privacy existed at common law stemming from both tort law and
constitutional law.47 Moreover, the court stated that the majority of
American jurisdictions have recognized the existence of a right to pri-
vacy and that many states have actions to remedy privacy torts.48 Addi-
tionally, the court explained that the Supreme Court of the United States
has considered how new technology intrudes on the right of privacy in its
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.49 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a
violation of an individual’s biometric privacy rights “has a close relation-
ship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis
for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”50
The Ninth Circuit explained that the common law understanding of
privacy includes the “individual’s control of information concerning his
or her person.”51 The court stated that, similar to the cell-site location
technology in Carpenter v. United States,52 facial-recognition technol-
ogy could gather highly-detailed information.53 The detailed information
could be used to identify an individual in any of the millions of photo-
graphs uploaded to Facebook and to pinpoint the individual’s location.54
The court also looked to future uses of facial-recognition technology
such as to identify the individual from a street surveillance photograph or
to unlock their cell phone.55 Hence, the creation of a face template using
facial-recognition technology without consent and without alleging fur-
ther harm infringes on concrete interests.56
45 See id.
46 Id. at 1271–72 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
47 Id. at 1271–73.
48 Id. at 1272.
49 See id. 1272–73; Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (involving thermal imaging); U.S.
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (involving GPS); Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (2018)
(involving cell-site location information); Riley v. CA, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (involving cell
phone storage).
50 Id. at 1273 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. At 1549 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
51 Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206.
53 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1273.
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Next, the Ninth Circuit examined legislative judgment. The court
observed that the Illinois General Assembly stated that “[t]he public wel-
fare, security, and safety will be served by regulating” the collection,
storage, use, and deletion or biometric information.57 Moreover, the
court found that BIPA was enacted to protect an individual’s privacy
rights in their biometric identifiers.58 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Illinois Supreme court that a person “could be ‘aggrieved’ . . . whenever
a private entity fails to comply” with section 15 of BIPA.59 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that section 15 of BIPA was designed to protect con-
crete interests.60
2. The Collection, Storage, and Use of Plaintiffs’ Face Templates Is
A Substantive Harm
The plaintiffs contended that the collection, use, and storage of their
face templates without consent violated section 15(b) of BIPA and that
they did not need to claim further harms.61 Facebook argued that plain-
tiffs needed to claim harm beyond a procedural violation and relied on
Bassett v. ABM Parking Services.62 In Bassett, the defendant violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act by not redacting a credit card’s expiration date
on a receipt.63 The Bassett court did not find a substantive harm because
the violation did not cause a disclosure of the consumer’s financial
information.64
The Ninth Circuit stated that under the common law, an intrusion
into privacy rights by itself makes a defendant subject to liability.65 The
court explained that the protected privacy right “is the right not to be
subject to the collection and use of such biometric data . . . .”66 Further-
more, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Bassett because the Fair Credit Re-
porting Act was designed to prevent disclosure and identity theft.67 In
Bassett, Congress specified in amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting
Act that to establish a willful violation of the statute requires an allega-
57 Id. (quoting Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/5(g) (2008)
(internal quotations omitted)).
58 Id.




62 Id. at 1271; Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., 883 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018).




67 Bassett, 883 F.3d 776.
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tion of harm to the consumer’s identity.68 BIPA does not require a fur-
ther allegation of disclosure or harm.69
Thus, under BIPA, the mere collection and use of biometric data
without consent “would necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive pri-
vacy interests.”70 Since both parts of the two-step approach were met, the
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs alleged a concrete and particularized
harm, sufficient to establish Article III standing.71
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING CLASS CERTIFICATION
The general standard of review when parties appeal from the grant
of class certification is “abuse of discretion.”72 The district court is given
more deference when reviewing a grant of class certification than when
reviewing a denial.73 A district court abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law.74 The court had to review de novo the legal determina-
tions made in support of the decision to grant class certification.75
Facebook argued that the district court abused its discretion by
granting class certification.76 First, Facebook claimed that questions of
law or fact common to class members did not predominate over ques-
tions affecting individual plaintiffs.77 Second, Facebook contended that
the potential for a significant statutory damages award would make indi-
vidual actions superior to the difficulties of managing a class action
lawsuit.78
3. Questions of Law or Fact Common to Class Members
Predominate
Facebook argued that questions of law or fact common to class
members did not predominate over questions affecting individual plain-
tiffs.79 Facebook contended that BIPA violations can occur in several
68 See Bassett, 883 F.3d at 778.
69 See Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1275.
70 Id. at 1274.
71 Id. at 1275.
72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quota-
tions omitted)).
74 Id. (quoting Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 909 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018)).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1276.
78 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
79 Id.
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locations, such as where: the person uses Facebook, Facebook scans pho-
tographs, or Facebook stores face templates.80 Using the Illinois extrater-
ritoriality doctrine, Facebook believed that each plaintiff must provide
evidence that events in their case occurred primarily and substantially
within the state of Illinois.81 Facebook suggested that class members pro-
vide individualized proof of the location where relevant events tran-
spired.82 Relevant events would include where: the photograph was
uploaded, Facebook performed facial recognition analysis, or Facebook
gave a tag suggestion.83 Thus, according to Facebook, questions individ-
ual to each class member would predominate.84
The court stated that there was predominance sufficient for class cer-
tification when “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”85
Moreover, under the Illinois extraterritoriality doctrine, an Illinois plain-
tiff may not maintain a cause of action under a state statute for transac-
tions that transpired outside of Illinois.86 However, plaintiffs can bring an
action if the events of the transaction occurred “primarily and substan-
tially within Illinois.”87
The Ninth Circuit expressed that extraterritoriality questions could
be decided on a class-wide basis without defeating predominance.88 The
questions created by the extraterritoriality doctrine included whether rel-
evant events took place primarily and substantially in Illinois, or outside
of Illinois.89 Additionally, the court determined that the Illinois General
Assembly intended that BIPA apply to “individuals who are located in
Illinois, even if some relevant activities occur outside the state.”90 Thus,
the court found that the district court did not err in finding predomi-
nance.91 Next, the court analyzed whether the lower court erred by find-
ing superiority.




84 Id. at 1275–76.
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
86 Id. at 1275 (citing Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 853 (Ill.
2005)).
87 Id. (quoting Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 853–54 (internal quotation marks omitted)).





Robles: Patel v. Facebook, Inc.
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2020
70 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
4. The Potential for Significant Statutory Damages Does Not Make
Individual Actions Superior to a Class Action Lawsuit
Facebook contended that individual lawsuits would be superior be-
cause it would be difficult to manage such a large class action.92 Addi-
tionally, Facebook claimed that individual actions would be superior to a
class action because of the potential for a significant statutory damages
award.93 BIPA allows for damages of one thousand dollars for each neg-
ligent violation, or five thousand dollars for each intentional or reckless
violation.94
The court explained that there is superiority sufficient for class certi-
fication when the class action is “superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”95 The court re-
sponded to Facebook’s argument by clarifying that the issue of caps on
statutory damages depends on the intent of the legislature, which the
court gathers from the express statutory language and legislative his-
tory.96 The court explained that BIPA’s text and legislative history did
not cap statutory damages.97 Moreover, the text and legislative history
did not indicate that substantial statutory damages were contrary to the
intent of the Illinois General Assembly.98 Therefore, the court affirmed
the district court’s ruling and added that there was no error of law or
abuse of discretion in granting class certification.99
III. IMPLICATIONS OF PATEL V. FACEBOOK, INC.
Following the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, on October 18, 2019, the
court denied a petition for rehearing en banc.100 On October 30, 2019,
the court granted a motion to stay while Facebook petitions for writ of
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.101 A Supreme Court
of the United States’ decision could resolve the current circuit split and
92 See id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
93 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
94 Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 14/20 (2008).
95 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D)).
96 Id. 1276.
97 See id. at 1277.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1276–77.
100 Josh Constine, $35B Face Data Lawsuit Against Facebook Will Proceed, TECH CRUNCH
(Oct. 18, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/18/facebook-35-billion-lawsuit/.
101 Daniel R. Stoller, Facebook Biometric Case Halted Pending Supreme Court Appeal,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 31, 2019, 7:17 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-secur
ity/facebook-biometric-case-halted-pending-supreme-court-appeal.
10
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clarify which intangible privacy harms are sufficient to bring a claim in
federal court.102
The increasing number of privacy-related lawsuits and government
fines reflect society’s growing concern that emerging technologies’ abil-
ity to collect detailed personal information can negatively impact indi-
viduals now and in the future. In addition to lawsuits brought by
plaintiffs, government agencies have enforced fines on technology com-
panies for privacy violations.103 For example, in July 2019, the Federal
Trade Commission and Facebook announced a five billion dollar settle-
ment for privacy-related violations.104
On September 3, 2019, a month after the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
Facebook responded by changing its tag suggestions program from a de-
fault setting of on with an opt-out option to a default setting of off with
an opt-in option.105 Facebook’s modifications to its tag suggestion pro-
gram following the court’s opinion indicate that both litigation and gov-
ernment fines are helping to enforce higher data privacy standards. Fears
of similar litigation and penalties for privacy violations will motivate
other companies to evaluate their use of data to comply with existing
privacy laws and future legislation.106
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirmed the district court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss for lack of standing and affirmed the class certifica-
tion.107 This case reinforces that an intangible injury such as the collec-
tion, storage, and use of biometric data without consent can be sufficient
to constitute a concrete injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing.108 If
the United States Supreme Court denies Facebook’s petition for certio-
102 Id.
103 Jay Cline, U.S. Takes The Gold in Doling Out Privacy Fines, COMPUTERWORLD (Feb. 17,
2014), https://www.computerworld.com/article/2487796/jay-cline—u-s—takes-the-gold-in-doling-
out-privacy-fines.html.
104 FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-
imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions.
105 Srinivas Narayanan, An Update About Face Recognition on Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (Sept. 3, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/update-face-recognition/.
106 Consumer Data Privacy Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct.
14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/consumer-
data-privacy.aspx.
107 See Facebook, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 956; see also In re Facebook, 326 F.R.D.
108 Facebook, 932 F.3d at 1270 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (2016)).
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rari, the underlying class action will continue to trial in the district court,
where Facebook stands to lose billions of dollars in damages.109
109 Josh Constine, $35B Face Data Lawsuit Against Facebook Will Proceed, TECH CRUNCH
(Oct. 18, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/10/18/facebook-35-billion-lawsuit/.
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